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Flow of Funds Q3 2009 – öffentliche Kredite steigen, private Kredite fallen weiter

Die Gesamtverschuldung der USA notierte im dritten Quartal 2009 bei 52,6 Mrd. US-Dollar marginal niedriger als im zweiten Quartal. Im Vergleich zum Vorjahresquartal liegt diese 1,4% höher.

Der jüngste ‘Flow of Funds’ Bericht weist  lediglich für den Staat positiven Wachstumsraten aus, so stieg das Kreditvolumen in Washington um 5,2% zum Vorquartal und 29,9% zum Vorjahr. Die Bundesstaaten/Gemeinden nahmen 1,3% respektive 3,3% mehr Kredite auf, während auf privater Seite entschuldet wurde.

Der tabellarische Überblick:

Tabelle

In Relation zum nominalen Bruttoinlandsprodukt beläuft sich die US Verschuldung auf 370,1% im dritten Quartal 2009 nach zuvor 373,1%; damit werden für jeden Dollar Wachstum rund 3,7 US-Dollar Schulden gemacht.

Im Blick die US Verschuldung/BIP seit 1952:

US Verschuldung/BIP

Charts des ‘ Flow of Funds’ Berichtes erweitern die Wirtschaftsdaten-Charts:
Flow of Funds Accounts Chart-Galerie.

Näheres zur finanziellen Situation der privaten Haushalte folgt (einschl. einer erstaunlichen Revision).

KID Konjunktur-Indikator Deutschland im Dezember 2009

… und weiter aufwärts!

die aktuelle Ausgabe des KID Konjunktur-Indikators Deutschland:
KID Konjunktur-Indikator Deutschland im Dezember 2009

hier bitte weiterlesen…

Griechenland unter Druck

Nachdem die Ratingagentur Standard & Poor’s gestern griechische Staatsanleihen auf die Beobachtungsliste setzte, erfolgte heute von Fitch eine Herabstufung des Länderratings von A- auf BBB+ (Quelle: Bloomberg). Erst am 22. Oktober diesen Jahres hatte Fitch den Daumen von A auf A- gesenkt.

Die gesamte Historie der Fitch-Ratings gibt es als xls-Datei: Fitch – Complete Sovereign Rating History (nettes Teil ;-) ).

Unregelmäßigkeiten bei der Dokumentation des Haushaltsdefizites hatten zu einer EU-Rüge geführt. Für 2008 liegt dieses bei 7,7% vom BIP, für 2009 schätzt Eurostat ein Haushaltsdefizit von 12,7% vom BIP.

Quelle: Economic Downturn Challenges Public Finances

Die Märkte quittieren die griechischen Turbulenzen mit einer Anhebung der Risikoprämie für den Ausfall fünfjähriger, griechischer Staatsanleihen:

Credit Default Swaps (CDS)

Mit 211 notieren die Credit Default Swaps (CDS)  auf dem höchsten Niveau seit dem April diesen Jahres.

Nachtrag am 9.12.2009:

Forex – Tageskommentar von Folker Hellmeyer, Chefanalyst der Bremer Landesbank,
EUR wegen Griechenland unter Druck – Moody’s Einlassungen zu USA und UK ignoriert!

Am US Arbeitsmarkt …

tut sich was .. oder doch nicht ?

Trim Tabs versucht die Entwicklung am Arbeitsmarkt auf Grund der Lohn- und Einkommenssteuereinnahmen zu beurteilen. Hier deren Einschätzung :

TrimTabs employment analysis, which uses real-time daily income tax deposits from all U.S.
taxpayers to compute employment growth, estimated that the U.S. economy shed 255,000 jobs in
November.
This past month’s results were an improvement of only 10.2% from the 284,000 jobs lost in
October…In November, the BLS revised their September and October job losses down a surprising
44.5%, or 203,000 job…

Irgendwie passt das nicht so recht mit den – 11.000 zusammen und macht auch keinen sinn, es sei denn man will den Markt auf Ende der null, null zero Zinspolitik einstimmen … ;-)

Die Bubble-Maschine – und läuft…und läuft…und läuft

US-China Trade

“For the first eight months of 2009, China’s goods exports to
the United States were $184.9 billion, while U.S. exports to China
were $41.2 billion, with China’s trade surplus standing at $143.7
billion, a decrease of 17.8 percent over the same period last year
($169.2 billion).“

Quelle:
2009 REPORT TO CONGRESS of the
U.S.-CHINA ECONOMIC AND
SECURITY REVIEW COMMISSION, Seite 21

Ich meine die Rede von Sen. Bunning zur Renominierung von Ben Shalom Bernanke…

verdient es hier gewürdigt zu werden ;-) :

Sen. Bunning implies he will fillibuster Bernanke’s re-nomination as Fed Chairman.
****************************************************************************************************

Bunning Statement On The Re-Nomination Of Ben Bernanke To Be Chairman Of The Federal Reserve

Senate Banking Committee
Thursday, December 3, 2009

As Prepared For Delivery:

Four years ago when you came before the Senate for confirmation to be Chairman of the Federal Reserve, I was the only Senator to vote against you.  In fact, I was the only Senator to even raise serious concerns about you.  I opposed you because I knew you would continue the legacy of Alan Greenspan, and I was right.  But I did not know how right I would be and could not begin to imagine how wrong you would be in the following four years.

The Greenspan legacy on monetary policy was breaking from the Taylor Rule to provide easy money, and thus inflate bubbles.  Not only did you continue that policy when you took control of the Fed, but you supported every Greenspan rate decision when you were on the Fed earlier this decade.  Sometimes you even wanted to go further and provide even more easy money than Chairman Greenspan.  As recently as a letter you sent me two weeks ago, you still refuse to admit Fed actions played any role in inflating the housing bubble despite overwhelming evidence and the consensus of economists to the contrary.  And in your efforts to keep filling the punch bowl, you cranked up the printing press to buy mortgage securities, Treasury securities, commercial paper, and other assets from Wall Street.  Those purchases, by the way, led to some nice profits for the Wall Street banks and dealers who sold them to you, and the G.S.E. purchases seem to be illegal since the Federal Reserve Act only allows the purchase of securities backed by the government.

On consumer protection, the Greenspan policy was don’t do it.  You went along with his policy before you were Chairman, and continued it after you were promoted.  The most glaring example is it took you two years to finally regulate subprime mortgages after Chairman Greenspan did nothing for 12 years.  Even then, you only acted after pressure from Congress and after it was clear subprime mortgages were at the heart of the economic meltdown.  On other consumer protection issues you only acted as the time approached for your re-nomination to be Fed Chairman.

Alan Greenspan refused to look for bubbles or try to do anything other than create them.  Likewise, it is clear from your statements over the last four years that you failed to spot the housing bubble despite many warnings.

Chairman Greenspan’s attitude toward regulating banks was much like his attitude toward consumer protection.  Instead of close supervision of the biggest and most dangerous banks, he ignored the growing balance sheets and increasing risk.  You did no better.  In fact, under your watch every one of the major banks failed or would have failed if you did not bail them out.

On derivatives, Chairman Greenspan and other Clinton Administration officials attacked Brooksley Born when she dared to raise concerns about the growing risks.  They succeeded in changing the law to prevent her or anyone else from effectively regulating derivatives.  After taking over the Fed, you did not see any need for more substantial regulation of derivatives until it was clear that we were headed to a financial meltdown thanks in part to those products.

The Greenspan policy on transparency was talk a lot, use plenty of numbers, but say nothing.  Things were so bad one TV network even tried to guess his thoughts by looking at the briefcase he carried to work.  You promised Congress more transparency when you came to the job, and you promised us more transparency when you came begging for TARP.  To be fair, you have published some more information than before, but those efforts are inadequate and you still refuse to provide details on the Fed’s bailouts last year and on all the toxic waste you have bought.

And Chairman Greenspan sold the Fed’s independence to Wall Street through the so-called “Greenspan Put”.  Whenever Wall Street needed a boost, Alan was there.  But you went far beyond that when you bowed to the political pressures of the Bush and Obama administrations and turned the Fed into an arm of the Treasury.  Under your watch, the Bernanke Put became a bailout for all large financial institutions, including many foreign banks.  And you put the printing presses into overdrive to fund the government’s spending and hand out cheap money to your masters on Wall Street, which they use to rake in record profits while ordinary Americans and small businesses can’t even get loans for their everyday needs.

Now, I want to read you a quote:  “I believe that the tools available to the banking agencies, including the ability to require adequate capital and an effective bank receivership process are sufficient to allow the agencies to minimize the systemic risks associated with large banks.  Moreover, the agencies have made clear that no bank is too-big-too-fail, so that bank management, shareholders, and un-insured debt holders understand that they will not escape the consequences of excessive risk-taking.  In short, although vigilance is necessary, I believe the systemic risk inherent in the banking system is well-managed and well-controlled.”

That should sound familiar, since it was part of your response to a question I asked about the systemic risk of large financial institutions at your last confirmation hearing.  I’m going to ask that the full question and answer be included in today’s hearing record.

Now, if that statement was true and you had acted according to it, I might be supporting your nomination today.  But since then, you have decided that just about every large bank, investment bank, insurance company, and even some industrial companies are too big to fail.  Rather than making management, shareholders, and debt holders feel the consequences of their risk-taking, you bailed them out.  In short, you are the definition of moral hazard.

Instead of taking that money and lending to consumers and cleaning up their balance sheets, the banks started to pocket record profits and pay out billions of dollars in bonuses.  Because you bowed to pressure from the banks and refused to resolve them or force them to clean up their balance sheets and clean out the management, you have created zombie banks that are only enriching their traders and executives.  You are repeating the mistakes of Japan in the 1990s on a much larger scale, while sowing the seeds for the next bubble.  In the same letter where you refused to admit any responsibility for inflating the housing bubble, you also admitted that you do not have an exit strategy for all the money you have printed and securities you have bought.  That sounds to me like you intend to keep propping up the banks for as long as they want.

Even if all that were not true, the A.I.G. bailout alone is reason enough to send you back to Princeton.  First you told us A.I.G. and its creditors had to be bailed out because they posed a systemic risk, largely because of the credit default swaps portfolio.  Those credit default swaps, by the way, are over the counter derivatives that the Fed did not want regulated.  Well, according to the TARP Inspector General, it turns out the Fed was not concerned about the financial condition of the credit default swaps partners when you decided to pay them off at par.  In fact, the Inspector General makes it clear that no serious efforts were made to get the partners to take haircuts, and one bank’s offer to take a haircut was declined.  I can only think of two possible reasons you would not make then-New York Fed President Geithner try to save the taxpayers some money by seriously negotiating or at least take up U.B.S. on their offer of a haircut.  Sadly, those two reasons are incompetence or a desire to secretly funnel more money to a few select firms, most notably Goldman Sachs, Merrill Lynch, and a handful of large European banks.  I also cannot understand why you did not seek European government contributions to this bailout of their banking system.

From monetary policy to regulation, consumer protection, transparency, and independence, your time as Fed Chairman has been a failure.  You stated time and again during the housing bubble that there was no bubble.  After the bubble burst, you repeatedly claimed the fallout would be small.  And you clearly did not spot the systemic risks that you claim the Fed was supposed to be looking out for.  Where I come from we punish failure, not reward it.  That is certainly the way it was when I played baseball, and the way it is all across America.  Judging by the current Treasury Secretary, some may think Washington does reward failure, but that should not be the case.  I will do everything I can to stop your nomination and drag out the process as long as possible.  We must put an end to your and the Fed’s failures, and there is no better time than now.

http://bunning.senate.gov/public/index.cfm?FuseAction=NewsCenter.NewsReleases&ContentRecord_id=556a0e84-feaa-d20f-2867-6793698d6974&Region_id=&Issue_id=&IsPrint=true

US credit crunch continues … für kleine und mittlere Firmen

Gretchen Morgenson NYT

“We are in unknown territory here,” he said. “Since the peak in October ’08, bank credit has dropped
by 8 percent. That is enormous and it is accelerating. The peak-to-trough drop in the early ’90s was just
1.3 percent and that was enough to scare the pants off the Fed.”
This credit cave-in is the driving force behind the Federal Reserve’s mortgage purchase program, Mr.
Shepherdson says. The last thing the central bank wants to see is a decline in the broad-based money
supply, because when that happens it usually means a depression is afoot. Money supply didn’t fall in the
early 1990s, but it fell by one-quarter during the 1930s.
The Fed’s asset purchase program is therefore not about driving down mortgage rates, Mr.
Shepherdson says, but about trying to prevent a collapse in the money supply. When the Fed buys assets it
creates deposits, which, in turn, helps offset the credit pullback. If the Fed wasn’t buying mortgages with
both hands, Mr. Shepherdson estimates, the money supply would be falling 1 percent a month.
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/11/29/business/economy/29gret.html?_r=1&ref=business

US Immobilienmarkt: Verkäufe im Oktober

Die vergangene Woche brachte Umsätze im US Immobilienmarkt; zunächst noch einmal zu den Verkäufen genutzter Immobilien; im Berichtsmonat Oktober stiegen diese um 10,1% im Vergleich zum September von 5,54 Mio. auf 6,10 Mio.. Seit dem Februar 2007 (6,55 Mio.) ist dies der höchste Stand. Im Vergleich zum Vorjahr notieren die Verkäufe 23,5% höher. Zweistellige Jahresraten waren in allen vier Regionen festzustellen; der Nordosten mit 24,7%, der Mittlere Westen mit 28,8%, der Süden mit 25,7% und der Westen mit 12,0%.

Die Vereinigung der Immobilienmakler NAR sieht im unteren Preissegment reichlich Schnäppchenjäger unterwegs; Stabilisierung erfahre der Immobilienmarkt durch die Verlängerung der Steuerabschreibungen bis in den April nächsten Jahres.

Enthalten in den Daten der NAR sind die Verkäufe der so genannten “distressed homes”, also die Notverkäufe und Zwangsversteigerungen. Diese schönen die Umsätze und da sie ca. 20% tiefer als marktüblich gehandelt werden, drücken sie die Hauspreise. Zuletzt machten diese im Oktober 29% aus.

Im Bild die Umsätze seit Februar 2009, der Anteil der “distressed homes” ist blau markiert:

Verkäufe genutzter Immobilien

Quelle: National Association of Realtors

Die Verkäufe neuer Immobilien stiegen im Oktober um 6,2% von 405K auf 430K, der Jahresvergleich befindet sich erstmals seit dem November 2005 im positiven Terrain bei 5,1%. Der Absturz dieser Datenreihe fiel deutlicher aus als der der genutzten Immobilien, maximal wurde ein Rückgang von -45,9% gesehen.

Abgebildet zum einen jeweils die jährliche Wachstumsrate der genutzten und neuen Immobilien:

Im folgenden Chart sind die gesamten US Immobilien ( genutzt + neu) in Mio. dargestellt:

Nahezu ein Viertel der amerikanische Hypothekenschuldner mit negativem Eigenkapital

First American CoreLogic schätzt, dass bei 10,7 Mio Eigenheimbesitzern in den USA, die Hypothek auf die Immobilie den Wert des beliehenen Objekts übersteigt. Der Anteil der Kreditnehmer mit negativem Eigenkapital unter den Hypothekenschuldnern betrage nach einer neuen Berechnungsmethode bundesweit 22,6 Prozent. Die bisherige Erfassungsmethode ergäbe einen Prozentsatz von 33,8 Prozent Pleitiers.

Eine Landkarte nebst sortierbarer Tabelle mit näheren Angaben über den Verschuldungsgrad kann man auf der Seite des Wall Street Journal in Augenschein nehmen.

Im Unterschied zu den Beleihungsrichtlinien unserer Kreditinstitute haften die amerikanischen Schuldner jedoch nicht mit ihrem gesamten Vermögen für ihre Verbindlichkeiten, sondern ausschließlich mit ihrem Haus oder der Wohnung, die beliehen wurde.

Mfg Helmut Wüllenweber

Modern day bank robbers … der eine oder andere Politclown kapiert es langsam …

US Senator Byron Dorgan:

It’s one of the most frustrating things. We essentially have had modern-day bankrobbers — except that they wore gray suits and not masks — and there’s been no accountability for it …
Every day we see energy speculators, war profiteers, managed health-care providers, media
propagandists, and/or financiers given some unfair advantage over the average consumers and
taxpayers, and the cumulative effect of the American people watching selfishness prevail over the public interest has been an undermining of the public’s trust in government.
This “anything goes” approach to capitalism has injured the very economy we have aspired to create.
I’m a big fan of the free-market system…This is not about a liberal or conservative philosophy. It is
about making sure our economy and the free-market system work for everybody…
There’s no question the system is rigged against the little guy. The bigger interests have a lot more
information. They jerry-rig the system so that they always win…
One is to separate investment banks and FDIC-insured banks. Second, prohibit FDIC-insured banks
from dealing in risky financial instruments on their own proprietary accounts… And third, abolish “too big to fail.” If you’re too big to fail, you’re too big. Too big to fail is what I call no-fault capitalism..
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2009/11/12/byron-dorgans-financial-p_n_355659.html

KID Konjunktur-Indikator Deutschland im November 2009

Ausbruch nach oben ?

die aktuelle Ausgabe des KID Konjunktur-Indikators Deutschland:
KID Konjunktur-Indikator Deutschland im  November 2009

hier bitte weiterlesen…

Das Konzept des Ordoliberalismus

In der Diskussion um die Zukunft des Kapitalismus möchte ich auf die Grundgedanken des Ordoliberalismus und in diesem Zusammenhang auf das Script von Prof. Dr. Volker Hentschel  Deutsche Wirtschaftsgeschichte (1914 – 1955) hinweisen, in dem auf Seite 198 ff. die Merkmale dieser marktwirtschaftlichen Wirtschaftsordnung skizziert werden.

Synthese von individueller Freiheit und wirtschaftlicher Ordnung

- individuelle Freiheit als natürliches Recht des Menschen
- Ordnung als Koordination der individuellen wirtschaftlichen Interessen und Pläne im Gesamtinteresse (= optimale Versorgung der Gesellschaft mit Gütern)

Schließt aus: Zentralverwaltungswirtschaft und „Laissez faire – Liberalismus“
Fordert: Herstellung und Garantie einer Wettbewerbsordnung durch einen starken, demokratisch legitimierten Staat d. h. die Koordination individueller Interessen, Entscheidungen und Handlungen durch den vom Preismechanismus gesteuerten Wettbewerb privater, handlungsfähiger und verantwortlicher Eigentümer auf freien und offenen Märkten.

Vorteile des Wettbewerbs auf freien Märkten

- maximale Leistung und optimale Marktversorgung
- Steuerung des Marktes (= Bestimmung der Produktion) durch die Wünsche der Verbraucher
- Reaktionsgeschwindigkeit und Anpassungsflexibilität
- leistungsgerechte Verteilung von Einkommen und Gütern

Bedingungen der Wirksamkeit des Wettbewerbs

- Institutionelle Garantie von Geldwertstabilität
- im Innern und nach außen offene Märkte
- Privateigentum an Produktionsmitteln
- Vertragsfreiheit, die nicht zur Beseitigung des Wettbewerbs nutzbar
- uneingeschränkte Haftung der Unternehmensleitungen
- Konstanz der Wirtschaftspolitik

MfG Helmut Wüllenweber

Be Prepared for the Worst …

Ron Paul in Forbes

The large-scale government intervention in the economy is going to end badly.

hier ist noch einer der es kommen sah … schon 1995

damals hatte Robert Rubin darauf gedrängt den Glass-Steagall Akt zu beseitigen. Ich hoffe es ist i.O. den alten Leserbrief komplett zu publizieren :

NY Times
End Bank Law and Robber Barons Ride Again
Published: Sunday, March 5, 1995

To the Editor:

Re “For Rogue Traders, Yet Another Victim” (Business Day, Feb. 28) and your same-day article on Treasury Secretary Robert E. Rubin’s proposal to eliminate the legal barriers that have separated the nation’s commercial banks, securities firms and insurance companies for decades: The American Bankers Association, Senator Alfonse M. D’Amato, Representative Jim Leach and Treasury Secretary Rubin are gravely misguided in their quest to repeal the Glass-Steagall Act.

Their contention that insurance companies, commercial banks and securities firms should be freed from legislative obstructions is predicated on fallacious, historically inaccurate statements. If the Baring Brothers failure does not give them pause, a history lesson is our only hope before the Administration and bank lobby iron out their differences and set the economy back 90 years.

The argument that American financial intermediaries will become “more efficient and more internationally competitive” is false. The American financial system is the most stable, most profitable and most dynamic in the world.

The notion that Glass-Steagall prevents American financial intermediaries from fulfilling their utmost potential in a global marketplace reflects inadequate understanding of the events that precipitated the act and the similarities between today’s financial marketplace and the market nearly a century ago.

Although Glass-Steagall was enacted during the Great Depression, it was put in place because the Aldrich-Vreeland Act of 1908, the blue-sky laws following 1910 and the Federal Reserve System of 1913 failed to keep the concentration of financial power in check. The investment climate that ultimately led to Glass-Steagall was one filled with emerging markets, interlocking control of productive resources and widespread bank ownership of securities.

Ever since railroad securities began driving secondary capital markets in the late 1860’s, “emerging markets” have existed for investors looking for high-yield opportunities, and banks have been primary agents in industrial development. In the 19th century, emerging markets were scattered throughout the United States, and capital flowed into them from New York, Boston, Philadelphia and London. In the same way, capital flows from the United States, Japan and England to Latin America and the Pacific rim — today we just have more terms to define the market mechanisms.

The economy and financial markets were even more interconnected in the 19th century than now. Commercial and investment banks could accept deposits, issue currency, underwrite securities and own industrial enterprises. With Glass-Steagall lifted, we will chart a course returning us to that environment.

J. P. Morgan and Andrew Mellon made their billions through inter locking directorates and outright ownership of hundreds of nationally prominent enterprises. Glass-Steagall is one crucial piece of a litany of legislation designed to place checks and balances on the concentration of financial resources. To repeal it would be tantamount to bringing back the days of the robber barons.

The unbridled activities of those gifted financiers crumbled under the dynamic forces of the capital marketplace. If you take away the checks, the market forces will eventually knock the system off balance.

MARK D. SAMBER
Stamford, Conn.
Feb. 28, 1995

The writer is a management consultant specializing in business history.

Subprime Darlehen erleben eine Renaissance

Die Notenbank von San Francisco berichtet, dass der Anteil der Subprime-Darlehen an den Hypotheken in den USA wieder auf über 20 Prozent gestiegen ist. Dieser Wert entspricht dem Marktanteil aus dem Jahr 2006.

Die britische Finanzaufsichtsbehörde FSA teilt mit, dass auf dem Höhepunkt des Immobilienbooms sogar knapp die Hälfte der Darlehen ohne Einkommensnachweis vergeben wurde.

Derweil haben nach Angaben der OECD die konsumfreudigen Briten im Jahr 2008 private Verbindlichkeiten inklusive Hypotheken in Höhe von 183 Prozent eines verfügbaren Jahreseinkommens angehäuft. Die amerikanische Privathaushalte stehen mit 134 Prozent, die Deutschen mit 99 Prozent eines Jahreseinkommens in der Kreide.

MfG Helmut Wüllenweber