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Wie gewonnen, so zerronnen …

Am Freitag konnten in den USA die Auftragseingänge der langlebigen Wirtschaftsgüter für den Berichtsmonat Juli überraschen. Im Konsensus wurden +2,5% im Monatsvergleich erwartet, geliefert wurden +4,2%. Allseits quittierten die Märkte den unerwarteten Anstieg mit einem Kursfeuerwerk.

Der volatile Transportsektor hielt die Auftragseingänge über Wasser; Autobauer und Zulieferer konnten sich über ein plus von 12,8% freuen, der Flugzeugbau verbuchte im Monatsvergleich +35,9%. So verzeichneten die Auftragseingänge ohne den Transportsektor einen Rückgang von 0,4%. Auf Jahresbasis notierten diese bei -0,3%.

Am aussagekräftigsten gelten die Auftragseingänge für zivile Investitionsgüter ohne den Flugzeugbau. Hier manifestiert sich eine rückläufige wirtschaftliche Aktivität; im Jahresvergleich schrumpft dieser Sektor den zweiten Monat in Folge, nun um -5,6%. Ein Niveau, das zuletzt Ende 2009 gesehen wurde. In den letzten 20 Jahren mündete ein solcher Stand in eine Rezession.

Die Partylaune wurde am Freitag von Qantas eingetrübt, Bloomberg meldete, dass diese 35 Flugzeuge bei Boeing mit einem Auftragsvolumen von 8,5 Milliarden USD stornierten. (Boeing Loses Qantas Order for 35 Dreamliners After Delays).

Gespannt darf die Revision abgewartet werden …

Auftragseingänge langlebiger Wirtschaftsgüter/zivile Investitionsgüter

US Aktien werden verkauft

Am 15. August publizierte das US Schatzamt für den Berichtsmonat Juni die monatliche Nettokapitalbilanz von US Titeln, die so genannten TIC-Daten (Treasury International Capital). Dazugehören neben Staatsanleihen, Agency Bonds, Unternehmensanleihen auch Aktien. Letztere finden zwar weniger Beachtung, lohnen gelegentlich aber einen Blick.

Der Appetit des Auslands auf US-amerikanische Aktien hat sich seit dem Frühjahr 2010 abgeschwächt. Zu Grunde gelegt wird der kumulierte 12-Monatssaldo. Seit nunmehr drei Monaten ist dieser Wert negativ, soll heißen mehr Ausländer verkaufen US Aktien als diese von Ausländern gekauft werden. Immer wieder kam es in der Historie zu solchen Ereignissen, zuletzt im Frühjahr 1995. Auffallend ist, dass im Juni 2012 der größte Abverkauf von US Aktien in der Historie stattfand.

Der nachfolgende Chart verdeutlicht das Bild:

TIC Daten: US Aktien werden verkauft

This is what bull markets are all about

Abseits aller Untergangsszenarien, Richard Bernstein, ehemals Analyst bei Merrill Lynch, ist weiterhin bullish für den US Aktienmarkt.

Bullenmärkte sterben in Euphorie und nicht mit einem Sentiment zögernder Investoren. Obwohl der S&P 500 nahe zu 100% seit dem März 2009 zugelegt habe, seien viele Investoren ängstlich, suchen nach Absicherung und ignorieren die Tatsache, dass die Aktienmärkte mehr Rendite bringen als die Rentenmärkte.

Private wie institutionelle Investoren hätten die Verdopplung des US Aktienmarktes verschlafen. Geht man davon aus, dass dieser Bullenmarkt typischen Mustern folgt, dann werden die Anleger noch versuchen auf den Zug aufzuspringen um nichts zu verpassen.

Der eigene Sentiment-Indikator generiere ein extrem bärisches Sentiment (eine Standardabweichung unterhalb der Langzeitnorm);  somit sendet dieser ein Kaufsignal:
Wall Street Sentiment Indicator
hier geht’s weiter zur kompletten Analyse: “This is what bull markets are all about “

Länderfinanzausgleich

Der Länderfinanzausgleich im historischen Überblick;  zunächst ein Chart, der die Jahre 1950 bis 1994 abbildet:

Länderfinanzausgleich 1950-1994

Ab 1995 wurden die neuen Bundesländer in den Länderfinanzausgleich mit eingeschlossen; für die Jahre 1995-2010 ergibt sich folgendes Bild:

LFZ-0002

Über die Jahrzehnte hinweg fanden erhebliche Umwälzungen statt. Während Nordrhein-Westfalen in den 50-iger und 60-iger Jahren noch ein maßgeblicher Zahler war und erst in den 80-iger Jahren Empfängerland wurde, erhielten andere Bundesländer kontinuierlich finanzielle Zuwendungen (Niedersachsen, Rheinland-Pfalz und das Saarland). Mit wenigen Unterbrechungen gehörte auch Schleswig Holstein zu den Empfängerländern.

Baden-Württemberg und Hessen sind die einzigen beiden Bundesländer, die kontinuierlich in den Länderfinanzausgleichstopf eingezahlt haben. Mit wenigen Unterbrechungen gehört Hamburg ebenfalls dazu. Nachdem Bayern jahrzehntelang bis Mitte der 80-iger Jahre zu den Profiteuren des Finanzausgleichs gehörte und die Entwicklung vom Agrarstaat zum Technologiestandort ermöglicht bekommen hat, findet es sich seit 1992 kontinuierlich bei den zahlenden Bundesländern wieder. Seit 2008 trägt Bayern den größten Anteil bei.

Die neuen Bundesländer sowie Berlin erhalten seit 1995, der Umstrukturierung des Länderfinanzausgleichs, kontinuierlich Zahlungen.

Die 50-iger Jahre:

Länderfinanzausgleich 50-iger Jahre

Die 60-iger Jahre:

Länderfinanzausgleich 60-iger Jahre

Die 70-iger Jahre:

Länderfinanzausgleich 70-iger Jahre

Die 80-iger Jahre:

Länderfinanzausgleich 80-iger Jahre

1990-1994:

Länderfinanzausgleich 1990-1994

Der Länderfinanzausgleich (LFA) sowie die Bundesergänzungszuweisungen (BEZ) für die Jahre 1995-2010:

Länderfinanzausgleich und Bundesergänzungszuweisungen 1995-2010

Die Daten für 2011 sind erst vorläufig:

Länderfinanzausgleich 2011

Datenquellen: Bundesministerium für Finanzen und statistisches Bundesamt

Wiederaufnahme

Nach einer Ruhepause von zwei gut Jahren werden nun wieder gelegentlich Beiträge im Blog veröffentlicht. Die Frequenz und der Umfang wird im Vergleich deutlich heruntergefahren.

Die Kommentarfunktion bleibt vorerst abgeschaltet.

Mal schauen, wie es sich angeht.

Cordula Sauerland

Blog

Liebe Leser/-innen,

bis auf weiteres werden im Markt-Daten Blog keine neuen Beiträge publiziert. Die Kommentarfunktion ist abgeschaltet.

viele Grüße

Cordula Sauerland

CREDIT CONTRACTION CONTINUES

nicht nur in D :

David Rosenberg zu den ständigen Manipulationen der US Daten :
It’s fascinating to watch this game when it comes to the release of the Fed’s consumer credit data. The data for December, which came out on February 5, came in far better than expected — falling only $1.7bln in December versus expectations of -$10.0bln. At the same time, the November figure, to very little fanfare, was revised to -$23.9bln from -$17.5bln initially. And last then this past Friday, December consumer credit was revised lower, by $2.9bln, to now show -$4.6bln from -$1.7bln initially. Hmmm. So what we have here are the revisions in the data over the last two months painting a much different picture of the level of improvement.
Revolving consumer credit (credit cards) slid $1.7 billion in January and the level, at $864.4 billion, is now the lowest since October 2006…
… This is key and attests to the lingering consumer frugality theme
We don’t like to appear as conspiracy theorists, but if you recall, the equity market bottomed on February 5 on two pieces of news that triggered a significant intra-day reversal. The first was the initial hints of an EU rescue plan for Greece. Later in the day, December’s consumer credit data were released, showing a modest decline of $1.7 billion versus the estimate of a $10 billion contraction. When you take into account the downward revision to November, what comes out of the wash is a December level of consumer credit outstanding that is was actually $6 billion lower than expected. But obviously not the way the data are being treated by Wall Street research departments or the media for that matter.

California One Step Closer To Insolvency After State Cancels $2 Billion General Obligation Bond Sale

gefunden auf Zerohedge

Five days ago a great white hope appeared for the great bankrupt Golden State (Baa1/A-), in the form of $2 billion in GO bonds, which were supposed to be promptly syndicated via underwriters JPMorgan and Morgan Stanley. This would have been the first bond sale for California since November: a critical milestone as the state creeps ever closer to a full-on default. Unfortunately, the creeping just turned into a casual jog after Jane Wells (@janewells) just tweeted that California has cancelled its bond sale “after legislature fails to approve cash management flexibility bill [the] Treasurer said he needed to attract investors.”

Moody`s Kriterien aus 2009 für AAA Nation Ratings

“For a AAA government to be downgraded, Moody’s must have concluded that the deterioration in credit
metrics is (1) observable and material in absolute terms; (2) observable and material in relative terms;
and (3) unlikely to be reversed in the near future. The decision underlying a potential downgrade would
also depend on the extent of the actual and potential deterioration of a government’s balance sheet;
whether a country’s economic model can be regenerated, thereby allowing the economy to rebound; and
whether governments can repair their fiscal position by raising taxes or cutting expenditure.”

Tja, wann in 2010 werden die sich an ihre Kriterien erinnern ?

allerdings ist wie immer alles relativ  :

“Moody’s believes that there will always have to be at least one Aaa issuer — an ‘anchor’
of the rating scale. Without it, the “rating scale” becomes meaningless.”

Griechenland ist überall … Auszug von The Privateer

The 2011 Obama Budget
Along with Mr Obama’s proposed fiscal 2011 budget totalling $US 3.8 TRILLION, the White House
recently released a prediction that US debt levels would reach 77 percent of US annual GDP – by 2020.
The US Treasury’s funded debt as of February 16 was $US 12.385 TRILLION. According to the US
government’s Bureau of Economic Analysis, the advance estimate of real 2009 GDP showed a growth of
0.1 percent from the equivalent period in 2008. US real GDP in 2008 decreased by 1.9 percent. There is
as yet no precise figure for US GDP in 2009, but the CIA fact book estimates it at $US 14.270 Billion.
Two facts not in the CIA’s book should stand out in bold relief. First, if the CIA is right, the new
Treasury debt limit of $US 14.294 TRILLION is now HIGHER than US GDP. Second, current US
Treasury funded debt at $US 12.385 TRILLION (see above) is the equivalent of 86.8 percent of the CIA’s
estimate of US GDP in 2009.
So where did the White House get its estimate that US debt levels will reach 77 percent of US annual
GDP ten years from now? The same place it gets all its economic projections from: Wishful thinking.
For decades, that has been good enough. But it won’t be good enough for much longer, as the Treasury’s
TIC report makes perfectly clear.

Kann man von diesen Erkenntnissen auf die Zukunft schliessen ?

1.     “Bubbles generally are perceptible only after the fact.  To spot a bubble in advance requires a judgment that hundreds of thousands of informed investors have it all wrong.  While bubbles that burst are scarcely benign, the consequences need not be catastrophic for the economy” -  Alan Greenspan June 17, 1999

2.     “It was far from obvious that bubbles, even if identified early, could be preempted short of the central bank inducing a substantial contraction in economic activity – the very outcome we would be seeking to avoid. Prolonged periods of expansion promote a greater rational willingness to take risks, a pattern very difficult to avert by a modest tightening of monetary policy…we recognized that, despite our suspicions, it was very difficult to definitively identify a bubble until after the fact…the idea that a collapse of a bubble can be softened by pricking it in advance is almost surely an illusion”  — Alan Greenspan August 30, 2002

3.     “There is no housing bubble to go bust”… “Home-price increases largely reflect strong economic fundamentals.”– Ben Bernanke, October 27, 2005

4. “the impact on the broader economy and financial markets of the problems in the sub-prime markets seems likely to be contained,”
Ben Bernanke, 28 March 2007

5. “And we will never return to the old boom and bust”
Gordon Brown, 21 March 2007

6. Oct. 29 (Bloomberg) — U.S. Treasury Secretary Timothy Geithner said commercial real estate woes won’t set off a new banking crisis, in remarks to the Economic Club of Chicago.
“I don’t think so,” Geithner said, when asked whether commercial real estate could set off another banking meltdown. “That’s a problem the economy can manage through even though it’s going to be still exceptionally difficult.”

Entertaining interview with Jim Rogers

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=l6nMHwF6Ks8&feature=player_embedded

Vernichtendes Urteil über das TARP-Programm der USA

Office of the Special Inspector General
for the Troubled Asset Relief Program

(Leitung: Neil Barofsky)

Quarterly Report to Congress
January 30, 2010

Executive Summary (S. 6)

• To the extent that huge, interconnected, “too big to fail” institutions contributed
to the crisis, those institutions are now even larger, in part because of the substantial
subsidies provided by TARP and other bailout programs.

• To the extent that institutions were previously incentivized to take reckless risks
through a “heads, I win; tails, the Government will bail me out” mentality, the
market is more convinced than ever that the Government will step in as necessary
to save systemically significant institutions. This perception was reinforced
when TARP was extended until October 3, 2010, thus permitting Treasury to
maintain a war chest of potential rescue funding at the same time that banks
that have shown questionable ability to return to profitability (and in some cases
are posting multi-billion-dollar losses) are exiting TARP programs.

• To the extent that large institutions’ risky behavior resulted from the desire to
justify ever-greater bonuses — and indeed, the race appears to be on for TARP
recipients to exit the program in order to avoid its pay restrictions — the current
bonus season demonstrates that although there have been some improvements
in the form that bonus compensation takes for some executives, there has been
little fundamental change in the excessive compensation culture on Wall Street.

• To the extent that the crisis was fueled by a “bubble” in the housing market, the
Federal Government’s concerted efforts to support home prices — as discussed
more fully in Section 3 of this report — risk re-inflating that bubble in light of
the Government’s effective takeover of the housing market through purchases
and guarantees, either direct or implicit, of nearly all of the residential mortgage
market.

Stated another way, even if TARP saved our financial system from driving off
a cliff back in 2008, absent meaningful reform, we are still driving on the same
winding mountain road, but this time in a faster car.

US Auftragseingang Langlebige im November revidiert

natürlich war das nur ein Versehen, siehe weiter unten …

The Commerce Department revised November
Durable Goods Orders sharply lower, from +0.2% to -0.7%.
The Census Bureau identified a processing error that occurred when revising historic seasonally adjusted data for the November (data month) releases. The data have been corrected…
http://www.census.gov/manufacturing/m3/

Theft! Were the US & UK central banks complicit in robbing the middle classes?

Liebe Cordula, ich weiss es geht hier um Markt Daten, ich finde der Mut dieses Mannes verdient eine (weitere) Ausnahme ;-)

Die Charts gibts es nur auf Zero Hedge :

http://www.zerohedge.com/article/scandal-albert-edwards-alleges-central-banks-were-complicit-robbing-middle-classes

Theft! Were the US & UK central banks complicit in robbing the middle classes?

by Albert Edwards, Societe Generale

Mr Bernanke’s in-house Fed economists have found that the Fed wasn’t responsible for the boom which subsequently turned into the biggest bust since the 1930s. Are those the same Fed staffers whose research led Mr Bernanke to assert in Oct. 2005 that “there was no housing bubble to go bust”? The reasons for the US and the UK central banks inflating the bubble range from incompetence and negligence to just plain spinelessness. Let me propose an alternative thesis. Did the US and UK central banks collude with the politicians to ‘steal’ their nations’ income growth from the middle classes and hand it to the very rich?

Ben Bernanke?s recent speech at the American Economic Association made me feel sick. Like Alan Greenspan, he is still in denial. The pigmies that populate the political and monetary elites prefer to genuflect to the court of public opinion in a pathetic attempt to deflect blame from their own gross and unforgivable incompetence.

The US and UK have seen a huge rise in inequality over the last two decades, as growth in national income has been diverted almost exclusively to the top income earners (see chart below). The middle classes have seen median real incomes stagnate over that period and, as a consequence, corporate margins and profits have boomed.

Some recent reading has got me thinking as to whether the US and UK central banks were actively complicit in an aggressive re-distributive policy benefiting the very rich. Indeed, it has been amazing how little political backlash there has been against the stagnation of ordinary people?s earnings in the US and UK. Did central banks, in creating housing bubbles, help distract middle class attention from this re-distributive policy by allowing them to keep consuming via equity extraction? The emergence of extreme inequality might never otherwise have been tolerated by the electorate (see chart below). And now the bubbles have burst, along with central banks? credibility, what now?

[1]

After reading Ben Bernanke?s speech, once again denying culpability for the bubble, I really didn?t know whether to laugh or cry (remember that Ben Bernanke, like Tim Geithner, was a key member of the Greenspan Fed). I feel like Peter Finch in the film Network, sticking my head out of the window and shouting “I’m as mad as hell and I’m not going to take it anymore!” Although criticism of the Fed (and the Bank of England) has now become louder and more widespread, I feel my longstanding derision for their actions during the so-called ?good years? puts me in a stronger position than some to offer further comment.

Opening my 2002-2005 file of old weeklies I did not have to go any further than the first paragraph of the top copy (end of December 2005). “As far as Alan Greenspan’s tenure at the Fed is concerned, we have spared few words of derision. We have made plain our views that the supposed US prosperity that has accompanied his tenure has been based on a grotesque mountain of debt. We have likened the economy to a Ponzi scheme which will ultimately collapse. He has allowed the funding of strong economic activity by mortgaging the US’s future against one bubble (equity) and then another (housing), which is now beginning to implode”. These are almost consensus thoughts now, but not then.

The pigmies that populate the political and monetary elites prefer to genuflect to the court of public opinion. Blaming the banks is simply a pathetic attempt to deflect the public fury from their own gross and unforgivable incompetence. We have stated before that banks are not the primary cause of the bust. Just as in Japan, a decade earlier, bank problems are a symptom of the bust. It is the monetary and regulatory authorities that are responsible for this mess. And it is not just obvious in retrospect. It was perfectly obvious from the beginning.

I was shocked by a recent survey of Wall Street and business economists, published in the Wall Street Journal (see Bernanke View Doubted 14 Jan? link [2]). Asked whether they agreed or disagreed with the proposition ‘excessively easy Fed policy in the first half of the decade helped cause a bubble in house prices’, some 42, or 74% agreed with the proposition. So unbelievably there are still 12 economists surveyed who did not agree! Even more incredible, a majority of academic economists did not agree with the proposition. Maybe they have sympathy for a fellow academic or maybe they actually believe the preposterous proposition that the western central banks were not in control of the bubbles which were primarily due to tidal waves of surplus savings washing across from Asia.

John Taylor shows this to be nonsense. There was no global savings glut (see chart below)

[3]

John Taylor is well known for his famous ?Taylor Rule? for the appropriate level of interest rates and he has been very vocal in his criticism of Fed laxity in the aftermath of the Nasdaq crash in his paper ?The Financial Crisis and Policy Responses: An Empirical Analysis of What Went Wrong’, Nov. 2008 and elsewhere – link [4]. His thesis is simple. Lax monetary policy caused the boom in housing upon which euphoric credit excesses were built. The subsequent bust was an inevitable mirror image of the boom. This simply would not have occurred had the Fed (and the Bank of England) acted earlier to tighten policy as shown in the Taylor?s counterfactual profiles (see charts below).

[5]

More recently, the San Francisco Fed published a paper this month showing that those countries which saw the steepest run-up in house prices over the last decade also saw the largest rise in household sector leverage (see charts below and link [6]). Of course the causality runs both ways. Loose monetary policy generates higher borrowing which pushes up house prices. Subsequently this prompts other households to borrow against the rising value of their houses to finance consumption via net equity extraction.

[7]

Generally most commentators have fallen for the populist line that the banks are to blame. Very rarely does a leading commentator pin the blame where it deserves to be ? on the central banks. Hence, I was very interested to read the Financial Times Insight column on Tuesday from the deep-thinking columnist, John Plender (interestingly his title in the print edition was “Blame the central bankers more than the private bankers” was changed to “Remove the punchbowl before the party gets rowdy” in the web edition – link [8]).

Plender?s point is classic Minsky. An unusually long period of economic stability, also known as The Great Moderation, engineered by Central Bank laxity inevitably created the conditions for the subsequent bust. “Central banks clearly bear much responsibility for past excessive credit expansion. The Fed’s gradualist and transparent approach to raising rates in middecade also ensured that bankers were never shocked into a recognition that unprecedented shrinkage of bank equity was phenomenally dangerous. Despite the popular perception that financial innovation caused so much of the damage in the crisis, the rise in bank leverage was a far more important factor”. His point that it takes guts to remove the punch-bowl when the party is in full swing is spot on. The Fed and the Bank of England were both gutless and spineless. Their love affair with The Great Moderation meant they simply were not prepared to tolerate a little more pain now to avoid a Minsky credit bust and massive unemployment later.

But what is the relationship, if any, between this extreme central bank laxity in the US and UK and these countries being at the forefront for the extraordinary rise in inequality over the last few decades (see cover chart)? And does it matter?

I was reading some typically thought-provoking comments from Marc Faber in his Gloom, Boom and Doom report about current extremes of inequality. It reminded me that our own excellent US economists Steven Gallagher and Aneta Markowska had also written on this. To be sure, the rise in inequality has been staggering in the US in recent years (see charts below).

[9]

It is well worth visiting the website of Emmanuel Saez of the University of California who has written extensively on this subject and now has updated his charts up until the end of 2008 (data available in Excel Format ? link [10]). The New York Times reported on the recently released Census Bureau data and showed not only that median income had declined over the last 10 years in real terms, but that this is the first full decade that real median household income has failed to rise in the US – link [11]. What is also so interesting from Professor Saez?s cross-sectional research is how inequality has clearly risen fastest in the Anglosaxon, freemarket economies of the US and the UK (also note that France, with much higher levels of equality, saw much more subdued growth in household leverage).

Our US economists make the very interesting point (similar to Marc Faber) that peaks of income skewness ? 1929 and 2007 ? tell us there is something fundamentally unsustainable about excessively uneven income distribution. With a relatively low marginal propensity to consume among the rich, when they receive the vast bulk of income growth, as they have, then the country will face an under-consumption problem (see 9 September The Economic News ?- link [12]. Marc Faber also cites John Hobson?s work on this same topic from the 1930s).

Hence, while governments preside over economic policies which make the very rich even richer, national consumption needs to be boosted in some way to avoid underconsumption ending in outright deflation. In addition, the middle classes also need to be thrown a sop to disguise the fact they are not benefiting at all from economic growth. This is where central banks have played their pernicious part.

I recalled seeing another article from John Plender on this topic back in April 2008. His explanation for why there had been so little backlash from the stagnation of ordinary people?s income at a time when the rich did so well was simple: ?”Rising asset prices, especially in the housing market, created a sense of increasing wealth regardless of income. Remortgaging homes over a long period of declining interest rates provided a convenient source of funds via equity withdrawal to finance increased consumption” – link [13].

Now you might argue central banks had no alternative in the face of under-consumption. Or you might conclude there was a deliberate, unspoken collusion among policymakers to ?rob? the middle classes of their rightful share of income growth by throwing them illusionary spending power based on asset price inflation. We will never know.

But it is clear in my mind that ordinary working people would not have tolerated these extreme redistributive policies had not the UK and US central banks played their supporting role. Going forward, in the absence of a sustained housing boom, labour will fight back to take its proper (normal) share of the national cake, squeezing profits on a secular basis. For as Bill Gross pointed out back in PIMCO?s investment outlook ?Enough is Enough’ of August 1997, “?When the fruits of society’s labor become maldistributed, when the rich get richer and the middle and lower classes struggle to keep their heads above water as is clearly the case today, then the system ultimately breaks down.”- link [14]. In Japan, low levels of inequality and inherent social cohesion prevented a social breakdown in this post-bubble debacle. With social inequality currently so very high in the US and the UK, it doesn?t take much to conclude that extreme inequality could strain the fabric of society far closer to breaking point.

[15]