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WEF 2009: Global crisis ‘has destroyed 40pc of world wealth’

Steve Schwarzman, chairman of private equity giant Blackstone, said an “almost incomprehensible” amount of cash had evaporated since the financial crisis took hold.

“Business will be very different,” he added.

His comments came on a day of the World Economic Forum characterised by the gloom of its participants and warnings that the crisis will endure for some time. News Corp chief executive Rupert Murdoch kicked off the meetings by warning that the atmosphere was worsening – despite global economic confidence plumbing the lowest depths on record.

“The crisis is getting worse,” he said. “It’s going to take drastic action to turn it around, if it can be turned around, quickly. I believe it will take a long time.”

ich auch …  ;-(

US Immobilienmarkt - uneinheitlich

Die gestern veröffentlichten Umsätze der New Homes Sales für den Dezember boten im Vergleich zu den Verkäufen der genutzten Immobilien ein neues Allzeittief. Mit 331 Tsd. annualisierten Immobilienverkäufen wurde das alte Tief von 338 Tsd. aus dem September 1981 unterschritten.
Der Vormonatswert wurde von 407 Tsd. auf 388 Tsd. nach unten revidiert. Die jährliche Wachstumsrate beläuft sich auf -44,8%, die Fallgeschwindigkeit hat sich beschleunigt.

Anfang der Woche hatten die Existing Homes Sales noch ein anderes Bild gezeigt. Im Vergleich zum Vormonat waren diese von 4,45 Mio. auf 4,74 Mio. angestiegen, die jährliche Wachstumsrate hat sich mit -3,5% von den zweistellig, negativen Werten entfernt.

Die folgende Grafik zeigt die erwähnten Wachstumsraten seit 1970. Deutlich wird dabei die unterschiedliche Entwicklung seit Anfang letzten Jahres auf dem Markt für genutzten Immobilien (blau Linie) wie auch dem Markt für neugebaute Immobilien (gelbe Linie).

Wachstumsraten

Das desolate Klima am US Markt für neugebauten Immobilien unterstreicht folgender Quotient:

neugebaute Immobilien zum Verkauf/verkauftErstmals in der Geschichte dieser Zeitreihe liegt die Anzahl der zum Verkauf stehenden Neubauten über der der verkauften neugebauten Immobilien. Für den Dezember standen jedem zum Verkauf stehenden Haus 0,93 verkaufte Häuser gegenüber. Die Entwicklung seit 1965 wird im Chart rechts dargestellt.

Zur Beurteilung des Immobilienmarktes wird von einigen Ökonomen die Dauer herangezogen, die unter den gegenwärtigen Bedingungen eine Immobilie zum Verkauf gestellt wird. Auch hier zeigt sich das unterschiedliche Bild für genutzten wie neue Immobilien; erstere stehen aktuell 8,7 Monate auf dem Markt, das niedrigste Niveau seit dem Mai 2007, während letztere mit 12,9 Monaten ein neues Allzeithoch generierten.

Auch hier der vergleichende Chart:

HauspreiseDie Hauspreise fallen in bekannter Weise in beiden Marktsegmenten. Für genutzte Einfamilienhäusern lagen diese auf einem Allzeittief, 14,8% unter dem Vorjahresniveau, während die Hauspreise der New Homes Sales mit -9,3% zum einen das zyklische Tief hinter sich gelassen haben, wie auch das Allzeittief bei -14,6% aus dem Sommer 1970 bestehen ließen.

Rechts nebenstehend der vergleichende Chart.

:

Es bleibt abzuwarten, wie die Entwicklung der unterschiedlichen Segmente des US Immobilienmarktes weitergeht. Skeptiker wie Optimisten der US Konjunktur werden sich in den Publikationen der vergangenen Woche bestätigt fühlen.

Fakt ist aber auch, dass sich der Marktanteil für Neubauten am Gesamtmarkt deutlich reduziert hat und mit 7,0% drastisch unter dem Mittelwert von ca. 20% der vergangenen 40 Jahre liegt.

Turbo Geithner holt früheren GS Lobbyisten

Wahrscheinlich wegen seiner Berufserfahrung :-(

Treasury Secretary Timothy Geithner picked a former Goldman Sachs lobbyist as a top aide Tuesday, the same day he announced rules aimed at reducing the role of lobbyists in agency decisions.
Mark Patterson will serve as Geithner’s chief of staff at Treasury, which oversees the government’s $700 billion financial bailout program. Goldman Sachs received $10 billion of that money.
Treasury spokeswoman Stephanie Cutter said Patterson “brings significant expertise to the job.”

  1. Patterson, who left the investment bank in April, signed the administration’s ethics pledge, which requires him to recuse himself from issues “directly and substantially related to my former employer.”

http://www.usatoday.com/news/washington/2009-01-27-lobbyist_N.htm?csp=34

Wann werden sie wohl die Guillotine am Times Square aufstellen …

Fed vs EZB Bilanz

Da Heli Ben wieder angedroht hat Staatsanleihen zu kaufen hier ein Vergleich der Bilanzen.

Ich vermute unter Other Assets sind alle diese “Toxic ” bzw wertlosen Papiere verbucht die man zum Nominalwert gekauft hat, damit die Banken diese nicht auf Marktwert abschreiben müssen. Also ca. 1 Billion USD Schrott bei der Fed vs. 219 Milliarden Euro Gold bei der EZB. Alllerdings gehört das Gold wenn ich mich recht erinnere den einzelnen EU Ländern und ob man das BRDDR Gold das ja bei der Fed in NY “verwahrt” wird, jemals verkaufen kann/darf ist mE. sehr zu bezweifeln. Ausserdem glauben viele Goldkäfer die Bankster hatten es geliehen und in den 90er Jahren am Markt verscherbelt. Bis zum Jahr 1999 war das ja auch noch ein sehr lukratives Geschäft, danach eher schwierig. Vielleicht war der Verkauf des britischen Goldes zum Tiefstpreis damals in den Jahren 2000 - 2002 Gordon Brown´s erster Bankster Bailout? ;-) Auf die nächste Fed Bilanz darf man sehr gespannt sein …

und noch mehr “Change”

William Dudley, former chief economist at Goldie, will replace Geithner as the head of the NY Fed.
Reuters: Before becoming the Fed’s chief trader in 2007, Dudley was chief economist at Goldman Sachs for 10 years, a role for which he was ranked No. 1 in Institutional Investor magazine’s league table of economists several times. He had joined Goldman Sachs in 1986, working in a number of capacities, including as former Treasury Secretary Robert Rubin’s senior economic adviser.
Prior to his years at Goldman, Dudley was in charge of regulatory analysis at J.P. Morgan, where he
co-authored a pamphlet that advocated repealing the Glass-Steagall Act, a law put in place during the Great Depression to separate commercial and investment banking. Some economists have criticized the repeal of Glass-Steagall in 1999 as paving the way for the risk-taking that has led to the current crisis.
Dudley began his career as an economist at the Fed’s Board of Governors in the early 1980s. He holds a PhD in economics from the University of California at Berkeley.
http://uk.reuters.com/article/usPoliticsNews/idUKTRE50Q0ZV20090127?pageNumber=2&virtualBrandChannel=0

Bloomberg: George Mitchell, President Barack Obama’s special Middle East troubleshooter, was
chairman of a law firm that was paid about $8 million representing Dubai’s ruler in connection with a child-trafficking lawsuit.
http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601087&sid=aa7hdtvtfYxc&refer=worldwide

Darkness at Davos May Hide Secrets From Transparency Spotlight

Darkness at Davos May Hide Secrets From Transparency Spotlight

By Simon Kennedy and Matthew Benjamin

Jan. 27 (Bloomberg) — When it comes to transparency, the world’s bankers won’t surrender without a fight.

Even with capitalism suffering its biggest crisis since the Great Depression — a meltdown born and nurtured in opaque markets from subprime mortgages to credit-default swaps — the bankers gathering with politicians in the Swiss resort of Davos this week may be unwilling to allow too much sunshine into the dark corners of their business.

“The financial system will kick back against transparency,” says Joseph Stiglitz, the Columbia University economist and Nobel Prize winner who’ll be in Davos.

“Those working in markets see information as power and money, so they depend on a lack of transparency for success,” says Stiglitz, who won his Nobel for research on information asymmetry — what happens when one party in a transaction has access to knowledge that others don’t.

The resistance may set up the ultimate test of strength between markets and governments, dictating the future of the world economy. As the global slump deepens, and President Barack Obama promises to exert a “watchful eye” over the financial system, the risk is new rules won’t be strong enough to stop banks repeating history and circumventing them.

Toothless

“Without teeth, the banks will roll right over this stuff in a couple of years,” said Roy Smith, a former partner at Goldman Sachs Group Inc. who has attended Davos in the past. “Wall Street’s filled with a lot of big guys. They know how the bread gets buttered, they know how to play the game.”

Bankers, once hailed as Masters of the Universe, return to the seminars and parties of the World Economic Forum’s annual meeting chastened by losses and writedowns that top $1 trillion. Deutsche Bank AG Chief Executive Officer Josef Ackermann, who said two years ago that many investment banks “have a very good future,” reported a record loss in the fourth quarter.

Some won’t be back at all. Former Merrill Lynch & Co. Chief Executive Officer John Thain, originally slated to be in Davos this week, lost his job on Jan. 22. A year after Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc. head Richard Fuld sat on a panel discussing sovereign wealth funds, his bank no longer exists.

Power Pendulum

Policy makers are now tightening their grip on the financial system. Timothy Geithner, Obama’s pick for Treasury Secretary, last week called for “comprehensive” regulatory changes. British Prime Minister Gordon Brown’s government has bought stakes across the banking industry and European Central Bank President Jean-Claude Trichet is pumping unlimited funds into the money markets.

“The pendulum of power has swung from financial institutions to politicians,” says Morgan Stanley Asia Chairman Stephen Roach, who was among the first to raise the specter of global recession at last year’s conference.

Obama will be represented by White House adviser and confidante Valerie Jarrett at the five-day conference, which starts tomorrow and is titled “Shaping the Post-Crisis World.” She will join Trichet, Brown and more than 2,500 other executives, officials and government leaders.

More Light

One of their main pushes will be to illuminate the murkier market practices that evolved during the boom. Banks pushed more and more of their investments off their balance sheets and beyond the reach of capital requirements. At the same time, subprime mortgage loans were repackaged into derivatives and became toxic as rising interest rates sparked a wave of defaults.

Obama wants to strengthen capital requirements on mortgage securities and derivatives and force banks to better disclose the assets they hold. U.K. officials are pushing for similar measures and Trichet’s ECB is angling for a bigger role in monitoring banks.

One of the problems for governments is that new securities laws are often so complicated that legislators need help from industry to craft them.

“The complexity of the legislation works in the industry’s favor,” says Paul Mahoney, a regulation scholar at the University of Virginia. The thrust of new regulations might be against banks, “but when it gets time to get the details down on paper, they can have real influence.”

History

That problem is almost as old as finance itself. In the 1690s, the dawn of share trading in London, brokers turned a government crackdown on short selling to their advantage. They persuaded Parliament to include in the new rules a ceiling on the number of legal brokers to 100, effectively locking rivals out of the system.

Franklin Roosevelt’s Truth in Securities Act, signed into law in 1933, met a similar fate. Aiming for better disclosure in the aftermath of the 1929 Wall Street Crash, the law ultimately helped major banks by freezing the existing underwriting system in their favor, says Mahoney.

Financiers are already lobbying. While they acknowledge greater transparency has its virtues — they’ve accepted the idea of an additional regulator for derivatives — they want to preserve the potential for profits and warn that too much disclosure risks confusing markets.

“Flooding investors with a lot of disparate information can be misleading,” says Charles Dallara, managing director of the Institute of International Finance, who will be in Davos. His organization represents more than 300 financial companies.

Flashpoint

Another flashpoint is so-called fair-value accounting, which requires companies to record assets every quarter to reflect market value. The idea is to give investors a better estimate of a company’s worth.

Bankers such as William Rhodes, senior vice chairman at Citigroup Inc. and a Davos delegate, say the standard is unfairly punishing during times of turmoil when buyers are scarce and assets become difficult to price.

Lawmakers must also avoid “going overboard with regulation” of hedge funds, billionaire investor George Soros warned Congress in November. “It would be a grave mistake to add to the forced liquidation currently dislocating markets by ill-considered or punitive regulations.”

How much light is ultimately cast on finance will show how much power governments have won over the market and the economy. While Harvard professor Ken Rogoff says “there’s going to be a sea change in transparency to match the crisis,” Stiglitz is “not very optimistic.”

“Many in the financial industry are ethically challenged and that has to be realized,” says Stiglitz. “What you don’t know is the source of Wall Street’s profits. The next crisis will also be about ‘if only we knew’ too.”

To contact the reporters on this story: Simon Kennedy in Paris at skennedy4@bloomberg.netMatthew Benjamin in Washington at mbenjamin2@bloomberg.net

Last Updated: January 26, 2009 19:01 EST

Gold

Für alle Besitzer von “Papier” Gold :

http://seekingalpha.com/article/91357-the-disconnect-between-supply-and-demand-in-gold-silver-markets

<<<That being said, the paper claims may have a lot of value, whether or not they are fake.  Derivatives dealers can write futures contracts, options, etc., according to CFTC rules, because paper “claims” to vault-stored silver and gold can be used as the legally mandated “cover” for futures contracts.  To understand the nature of paper claims, we must travel back in time, for a moment, to a class action against Morgan Stanley (MS).  According to the complaint, Morgan Stanley claimed that it bought physical silver, on behalf of various clients, and was storing it, in safe-keeping, in its vault in New York.  Allegedly, Morgan Stanley defrauded its clients from Feb. 19, 1986, and Jan. 10, 2007.  According to the complaint, it never bought any silver, but, all the while, continued to charge clients big fees for storing the imaginary metal.  Morgan Stanley is one of the biggest investment banks in the world.  It is one of the major players in precious metals.  Yet, according to the lawsuit, the paper claims to vaulted silver it issued to clients was nothing more than a lie.  One of Morgan Stanley’s defenses, interestingly enough, was that everything it did simply followed “standard industry practices.”

and from a friend in NY :

This reminds me of a conversation I had last week with an old friend of mine that asks me here and there my opinion on things and gold shares in particular. A few years ago he told me, 5 or 6 I think, he went to his bank here in NY and ask to buy gold. They said fine he bought the gold and he paid storage fees and the gold was kept with the bank, as agreed.
This year he went to the bank and asked for the gold, where it is stored, as he was charged small fees all these years. They told him that he has no gold. When he said, what do you mean I have no gold, they responded he has no PHYSICAL gold, just paper gold. He said he did not ask for paper gold, he thought he had physical gold. They said sorry, you can sell your paper gold here and go to another bank where you can buy physical gold. He did so.

I told him to take possession this time and do his own storing. How many people are having paper gold in the banks thinking they have bought the real thing? A lot I think.  This guy is pretty sophisticated, yet he had no idea that he had paper gold.

Yesterday - after 2 weeks - I managed to buy some Krugers at a good coin dealer in Cape Town.
Limit was 5 pieces per person, they were all old, not one coin was minted after 2000 . In other words they are either not manufacturing them at all or they are immediately sold out. IMO it is clear that once the people lose faith in paper currencies it will be absolutely impossible to buy physical.

ZB interveniert wieder

Heute wieder das schon gepostete Tickdata Pattern .

Wahrscheinlich befürchten diese Armleuchter die Märkte könnten sich zu rasch erholen … oder gehts um den Goldpreis ?

Zinsdifferenz und Kapazitätsauslastung

Eine gewisse Korrelation zwischen der Zinsdifferenz von US Staatsanleihen und Unternehmensanleihen mittlerer Bonität (Moddys BAA) und der Kapazitätsauslastung ist nicht von der Hand zu weisen. Die Renditen am amerikanischen Rentenmarkt spiegeln eindeutig die Erwartung einer sehr starken Abkühlung der US Wirtschaft wider, wobei das Ausmaß der jüngst zu beobachtenden Ausweitung dieser Zinsdifferenz als irrationale Übertreibung anzusehen ist.

Helmut Wüllenweber

The Road to Ruin - weils gerade so schön passt

Aus deutscher Sicht  fehlt noch Herr Assmussen

Road to ruin

Twenty-five people at the heart of the meltdown …

The worst economic turmoil since the Great Depression is not a natural phenomenon but a man-made disaster in which we all played a part. In the second part of a week-long series looking behind the slump, Guardian City editor Julia Finch picks out the individuals who have led us into the current crisis

Poll: Who led us down the Road to Ruin?

Greenspan Testifies At Senate Hearing On Oil Dependence

Former Federal Reserve chairman Alan Greenspan, who backed sub-prime lending. Photograph: Mark Wilson/Getty Images

Alan Greenspan, chairman of US Federal Reserve 1987- 2006
Only a couple of years ago the long-serving chairman of the Fed, a committed free marketeer who had steered the US economy through crises ranging from the 1987 stockmarket collapse through to the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks, was lauded with star status, named the “oracle” and “the maestro”. Now he is viewed as one of those most culpable for the crisis. He is blamed for allowing the housing bubble to develop as a result of his low interest rates and lack of regulation in mortgage lending. He backed sub-prime lending and urged homebuyers to swap fixed-rate mortgages for variable rate deals, which left borrowers unable to pay when interest rates rose.

For many years, Greenspan also defended the booming derivatives business, which barely existed when he took over the Fed, but which mushroomed from $100tn in 2002 to more than $500tn five years later.

Billionaires George Soros and Warren Buffett might have been extremely worried about these complex products - Soros avoided them because he didn’t “really understand how they work” and Buffett famously described them as “financial weapons of mass destruction” - but Greenspan did all he could to protect the market from what he believed was unnecessary regulation. In 2003 he told the Senate banking committee: “Derivatives have been an extraordinarily useful vehicle to transfer risk from those who shouldn’t be taking it to those who are willing to and are capable of doing so”.

In recent months, however, he has admitted at least some of his long-held beliefs have turned out to be incorrect - not least that free markets would handle the risks involved, that too much regulation would damage Wall Street and that, ultimately, banks would always put the protection of their shareholders first.

He has described the current financial crisis as “the type … that comes along only once in a century” and last autumn said the fact that the banks had played fast and loose with shareholders’ equity had left him “in a state of shocked disbelief”.

Politicians

Bill Clinton, former US president
Clinton shares at least some of the blame for the current financial chaos. He beefed up the 1977 Community Reinvestment Act to force mortgage lenders to relax their rules to allow more socially disadvantaged borrowers to qualify for home loans.

In 1999 Clinton repealed the Glass-Steagall Act, which ensured a complete separation between commercial banks, which accept deposits, and investment banks, which invest and take risks. The move prompted the era of the superbank and primed the sub-prime pump. The year before the repeal sub-prime loans were just 5% of all mortgage lending. By the time the credit crunch blew up it was approaching 30%.

Gordon Brown, prime minister
The British prime minister seems to have been completely dazzled by the movers and shakers in the Square Mile, putting the City’s interests ahead of other parts of the economy, such as manufacturers. He backed “light touch” regulation and a low-tax regime for the thousands of non-domiciled foreign bankers working in London and for the private equity business.

George W Bush, former US president
Clinton might have started the sub-prime ball rolling, but the Bush administration certainly did little to put the brakes on the vast amount of mortgage cash being lent to “Ninja” (No income, no job applicants) borrowers who could not afford them. Neither did he rein back Wall Street with regulation (although the government did pass the Sarbanes-Oxley Act in the wake of the Enron scandal).

Senator Phil Gramm
Former US senator from Texas, free market advocate with a PhD in economics who fought long and hard for financial deregulation. His work, encouraged by Clinton’s administration, allowed the explosive growth of derivatives, including credit swaps.

In 2001, he told a Senate debate: “Some people look at sub-prime lending and see evil. I look at sub-prime lending and I see the American dream in action.”

According to the New York Times, federal records show that from 1989 to 2002 he was the top recipient of campaign contributions from commercial banks and in the top five for donations from Wall Street. At an April 2000 Senate hearing after a visit to New York, he said: “When I am on Wall Street and I realise that that’s the very nerve centre of American capitalism and I realise what capitalism has done for the working people of America, to me that’s a holy place.”

He eventually left Capitol Hill to work for UBS as an investment banker.

Wall Street/Bankers

Abi Cohen, Goldman Sachs chief US strategist
The “perpetual bull”. Once rated one of the most powerful women in the US. But so wrong, so often. She failed to see previous share price crashes and was famous for her upwards forecasts. Replaced last March.

“Hank” Greenberg, AIG insurance group
Now aged 83, Hank - AKA Maurice - was the boss of AIG. He built the business into the world’s biggest insurer. AIG had a vast business in credit default swaps and therefore a huge exposure to a residential mortgage crisis. When AIG’s own credit-rating was cut, it faced a liquidity crisis and needed an $85bn (£47bn then) bail out from the US government to avoid collapse and avert the crisis its collapse would have caused. It later needed many more billions from the US treasury and the Fed, but that did not stop senior AIG executives taking themselves off for a few lavish trips, including a $444,000 golf and spa retreat in California and an $86,000 hunting expedition to England. “Have you heard of anything more outrageous?” said Elijah Cummings, a Democratic congressman from Maryland. “They were getting their manicures, their facials, pedicures, massages while the American people were footing the bill.”

Andy Hornby, former HBOS boss
So highly respected, so admired and so clever - top of his 800-strong class at Harvard - but it was his strategy, adopted from the Bank of Scotland when it merged with Halifax, that got HBOS in the trouble it is now. Who would have thought that the mighty Halifax could be brought to its knees and teeter on the verge of nationalisation?

Sir Fred Goodwin, former RBS boss
Once one of Gordon Brown’s favourite businessmen, now the prime minister says he is “angry” with the man dubbed “Fred the Shred” for his strategy at Royal Bank of Scotland, which has left the bank staring at a £28bn loss and 70% owned by the government. The losses will reflect vast lending to businesses that cannot repay and write-downs on acquisitions masterminded by Goodwin stretching back years.

Steve Crawshaw, former B&B boss
Once upon a time Bradford & Bingley was a rather boring building society, which used two men in bowler hats to signify their sensible and trustworthy approach. In 2004 the affable Crawshaw took over. He closed down B&B businesses, cut staff numbers by half and turned the B&B into a specialist in buy-to-let loans and self-certified mortgages - also called “liar loans” because applicants did not have to prove a regular income. The business broke down when the wholesale money market collapsed and B&B’s borrowers fell quickly into debt. Crawshaw denied a rights issue was on its way weeks before he asked shareholders for £300m. Eventually, B&B had to be nationalised. Crawshaw, however, had left the bridge a few weeks earlier as a result of heart problems. He has a £1.8m pension pot.

Adam Applegarth, former Northern Rock boss
Applegarth had such big ambitions. But the business model just collapsed when the credit crunch hit. Luckily for Applegarth, he walked away with a wheelbarrow of cash to ease the pain of his failure, and spent the summer playing cricket.

Ralph Cioffi and Matthew Tannin
Cioffi (pictured) and Tanninn were Bear Stearns bankers recently indicted for fraud over the collapse of two hedge funds last year, which was one of the triggers of the credit crunch. They are accused of lying to investors about the amount of money they were putting into sub-prime, and of quietly withdrawing their own funds when times got tough.

Lewis Ranieri
The “godfather” of mortgage finance, who pioneered mortgage-backed bonds in the 1980s and immortalised in Liar’s Poker. Famous for saying that “mortgages are math”, Ranieri created collateralised pools of mortgages. In 2004 Business Week ranked him alongside names such as Bill Gates and Steve Jobs as one of the greatest innovators of the past 75 years.

Ranieri did warn in 2006 of the risks from the breakneck growth of mortgage securitisation. Nevertheless, his Texas-based Franklin Bank Corp went bust in November due to the credit crunch.

Joseph Cassano, AIG Financial Products
Cassano ran the AIG team that sold credit default swaps in London, and in effect bankrupted the world’s biggest insurance company, forcing the US government to stump up billions in aid. Cassano, who lives in a townhouse near Harrods in Knightsbridge, earned 30 cents for every dollar of profit his financial products generated - or about £280m. He was fired after the division lost $11bn, but stayed on as a $1m-a-month consultant. “It seems he single-handedly brought AIG to its knees,” said John Sarbanes, a Democratic congressman.

Chuck Prince, former Citi boss
A lawyer by training, Prince had built Citi into the biggest bank in the world, with a sprawling structure that covered investment banking, high-street banking and wealthy management for the richest clients. When profits went into reverse in 2007, he insisted it was just a hiccup, but he was forced out after multibillion-dollar losses on sub-prime business started to surface. He received about $140m to ease his pain .

Angelo Mozilo, Countrywide Financial
Known as “the orange one” for his luminous tan, Mozilo was the chairman and chief executive of the biggest American sub-prime mortgage lender, which was saved from bankruptcy by Bank of America. BoA recently paid billions to settle investigations by various attorney generals for Countrywide’s mis-selling of risky loans to thousands who could not afford them. The company ran a “VIP programme” that provided loans on favourable terms to influential figures including Christopher Dodd, chairman of the Senate banking committee, the heads of the federal-backed mortgage lenders Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, and former assistant secretary of state Richard Holbrooke.

Stan O’Neal, former boss of Merrill Lynch
O’Neal became one of the highest-profile casualties of the credit crunch when he lost the confidence of the bank’s board in late 2007. When he was appointed to the top job four years earlier, O’Neal, the first African-American to run a Wall Street firm, had pledged to shed the bank’s conservative image. Shortly before he quit, the bank admitted to nearly $8bn of exposure to bad debts, as bets in the property and credit markets turned sour. Merrill was forced into the arms of Bank of America less than a year later.

Jimmy Cayne, former Bear Stearns boss
The chairman of the Wall Street firm Bear Stearns famously continued to play in a bridge tournament in Detroit even as the firm fell into crisis. Confidence in the bank evaporated after the collapse of two of its hedge funds and massive write-downs from losses related to the home loans industry. It was bought for a knock down price by JP Morgan Chase in March. Cayne sold his stake in the firm after the JP Morgan bid emerged, making $60m. Such was the anger directed towards Cayne that the US media reported that he had been forced to hire a bodyguard. A one-time scrap-iron salesman, Cayne joined Bear Stearns in 1969 and became one of the firm’s top brokers, taking over as chief executive in 1993.

Others

Christopher Dodd, chairman, Senate banking committee (Democrat)
Consistently resisted efforts to tighten regulation on the mortgage finance firms Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. He pushed to broaden their role to dodgier mortgages in an effort to help home ownership for the poor. Received $165,000 in donations from Fannie and Freddie from 1989 to 2008, more than anyone else in Congress.

Geir Haarde, Icelandic prime minister
He announced on Friday that he would step down and call an early election in May, after violent anti-government protests fuelled by his handling of the financial crisis. Last October Iceland’s three biggest commercial banks collapsed under billions of dollars of debts. The country was forced to borrow $2.1bn from the International Monetary Fund and take loans from several European countries. Announcing his resignation, Haarde said he had throat cancer.

The American public
There’s no escaping the fact: politicians might have teed up the financial system and failed to police it properly and Wall Street’s greedy bankers might have got carried away with the riches they could generate, but if millions of Americans had just realised they were borrowing more than they could repay then we would not be in this mess. The British public got just as carried away. We are the credit junkies of Europe and many of our problems could easily have been avoided if we had been more sensible and just said no.

Mervyn King, governor of the Bank of England
When Mervyn King settled his feet under the desk in his Threadneedle Street office, the UK economy was motoring along just nicely: GDP was growing at 3% and inflation was just 1.3%. Chairing his first meeting of the Bank’s monetary policy committee (MPC), interest rates were cut to a post-war low of 3.5%. His ambition was that monetary policy decision-making should become “boring”.

How we would all like it to become boring now. When the crunch first took hold, the Aston Villa-supporting governor insisted it was not about to become an international crisis. In the first weeks of the crunch he refused to pump cash into the financial system and insisted that “moral hazard” meant that some banks should not be bailed out. The Treasury select committee has said King should have been “more pro-active”.

King’s MPC should have realised there was a housing bubble developing and taken action to damp it down and, more recently, the committee should have seen the recession coming and cut interest rates far faster than it did.

John Tiner, FSA chief executive, 2003-07
No one can fault 51-year-old Tiner’s timing: the financial services expert took over as the City’s chief regulator in 2003, just as the bear market which followed the dotcom crash came to an end, and stepped down from the Financial Services Authority in July 2007 - just a few weeks before the credit crunch took hold.

He presided over the FSA when the so-called “light touch” regulation was put in place. It was Tiner who agreed that banks could make up their own minds about how much capital they needed to hoard to cover their risks. And it was on his watch that Northern Rock got so carried away with the wholesale money markets and 130% mortgages. When the FSA finally got around to investigating its own part in the Rock’s downfall, it was a catalogue of errors and omissions. In short, the FSA had been asleep at the wheel while Northern Rock racked up ever bigger risks.

An accountant by training, with a penchant for Porsches and proud owner of the personalised number plate T1NER, the former FSA boss has since been recruited by the financial entrepreneur Clive Cowdery to run a newly floated business that aims to buy up financial businesses laid low by the credit crunch. Tiner will be chief executive but, unusually, will not be on the board, so his pay and bonuses will not be made public.

Dick Fuld, Lehman Brothers chief executive
The credit crunch had been rumbling on for more than a year but Lehman Brothers’ collapse in September was to have a catastrophic impact on confidence. Richard Fuld, chief executive, later told Congress he was bewildered the US government had not saved the bank when it had helped secure Bear Stearns and the insurer AIG. He also blamed short-sellers. Bitter workers at Lehman pointed the finger at Fuld.

A former bond trader known as “the Gorilla”, Fuld had been with Lehman for decades and steered it through tough times. But just before the bank went bust he had failed to secure a deal to sell a large stake to the Korea Development Bank and most likely prevent its collapse. Fuld encouraged risk-taking and Lehman was still investing heavily in property at the top of the market. Facing a grilling on Capitol Hill, he was asked whether it was fair that he earned $500m over eight years. He demurred; the figure, he said, was closer to $300m.

… and six more who saw it coming

Andrew Lahde
A hedge fund boss who quit the industry in October thanking “stupid” traders and “idiots” for making him rich. He made millions by betting against sub-prime.

John Paulson, hedge fund boss
He has been described as the “world’s biggest winner” from the credit crunch, earning $3.7bn (£1.9bn) in 2007 by “shorting” the US mortgage market - betting that the housing bubble was about to burst. In an apparent response to criticism that he was profiting from misery, Paulson gave $15m to a charity aiding people fighting foreclosure.

Professor Nouriel Roubini
Described by the New York Times as Dr Doom, the economist from New York University was warning that financial crisis was on the way in 2006, when he told economists at the IMF that the US would face a once-in-a-lifetime housing bust, oil shock and a deep recession.

He remains a pessimist. He predicted last week that losses in the US financial system could hit $3.6tn before the credit crunch ends - which, he said, means the entire US banking system is in effect bankrupt. After last year’s bail-outs and nationalisations, he famously described George Bush, Henry Paulson and Ben Bernanke as “a troika of Bolsheviks who turned the USA into the United Socialist State Republic of America”.

Warren Buffett, billionaire investor
Dubbed the Sage of Omaha, Buffett had long warned about the dangers of dodgy derivatives that no one understood and said often that Wall Street’s finest were grossly overpaid. In his annual letter to shareholders in 2003, he compared complex derivative contracts to hell: “Easy to enter and almost impossible to exit.” On an optimistic note, Buffett wrote in October that he had begun buying shares on the US stockmarket again, suggesting the worst of the credit crunch might be over. Now is a great time to “buy a slice of America’s future at a marked-down price”, he said.

George Soros, speculator
The billionaire financier, philanthropist and backer of the Democrats told an audience in Singapore in January 2006 that stockmarkets were at their peak, and that the US and global economies should brace themselves for a recession and a possible “hard landing”. He also warned of “a gigantic real estate bubble” inflated by reckless lenders, encouraging homeowners to remortgage and offering interest-only deals. Earlier this year Soros described a 25-year “super bubble” that is bursting, blaming unfathomable financial instruments, deregulation and globalisation. He has since characterised the financial crisis as the worst since the Great Depression.

Stephen Eismann, hedge fund manager
An analyst and fund manager who tracked the sub-prime market from the early 1990s. “You have to understand,” he says, “I did sub-prime first. I lived with the worst first. These guys lied to infinity. What I learned from that experience was that Wall Street didn’t give a shit what it sold.”

Meredith Whitney, Oppenheimer Securities
On 31 October 2007 the analyst forecast that Citigroup had to slash its dividend or face bankruptcy. A day later $370bn had been wiped off financial stocks on Wall Street. Within days the boss of Citigroup was out and the dividend had been slashed.

Kathleen Corbet, former CEO, Standard & Poor’s
The credit-rating agencies were widely attacked for failing to warn of the risks posed by mortgage-backed securities. Kathleen Corbet ran the largest of the big three agencies, Standard & Poor’s, and quit in August 2007, amid a hail of criticism. The agencies have been accused of acting as cheerleaders, assigning the top AAA rating to collateralised debt obligations, the often incomprehensible mortgage-backed securities that turned toxic. The industry argues it did its best with the information available.

Corbet said her decision to leave the agency had been “long planned” and denied that she had been put under any pressure to quit. She kept a relatively low profile and had been hired to run S&P in 2004 from the investment firm Alliance Capital Management.

Investigations by the Securities and Exchange Commission and the New York attorney general among others have focused on whether the agencies are compromised by earning fees from the banks that issue the debt they rate. The reputation of the industry was savaged by a blistering report by the SEC that contained dozens of internal emails that suggested they had betrayed investors’ trust. “Let’s hope we are all wealthy and retired by the time this house of cards falters,” one unnamed S&P analyst wrote. In another, an S&P employee wrote:

“It could be structured by cows and we would rate it.”

• Tomorrow in part three of the Road to Ruin series - The Barons of Bankruptcy - how going bust can be a profitable business

Jeremy Grantham Newsletter

Obama and the Teflon Men pdf Part1

Das für mich als Konspiratisten interessante an diesem letzten Newsletter ist, daß er eigentlich beschreibt wie ansonsten sehr intelligente Menschen eine Krise herbeigeführt haben .

Natürlich glaubt er das war nicht gewollt, die Herren sind eben nicht nur smart sondern auch etwas gierig, aber es mangelt ihnen halt an Weisheit.
Seine klare Erkenntnis, daß die Obama Mannschaft das gleiche in grün ist lässt bei ihm scheinbar auch keine Zweifel an den guten Absichten dieser Verbrecher aufkommen.

Auch nicht sein eigener Hinweis auf die momentane Kaufkraft von Investment Dollars… (die es den Superreichen demnächst wieder ermöglicht gute Firmen mit 70% Rabatt einzukaufen)

Wahrscheinlich bin ich einfach zu mißtrauisch …

Zinsdifferenz zwischen Treasuries und Unternehmensanleihen

Der Renditeunterschied zwischen 10-jährigen US Staatsanleihen und Unternehmensanleihen mittlerer Bonität, zeigt, in welchen historischen Kontext die aktuelle Krise am Kapitalmarkt eingestuft wird. Dabei muss berücksichtigt werden, dass die Kurse amerikanischer Staatsanleihen spekulativ angetrieben sind und alle Anzeichen einer Spekulationsblase aufweisen.

Helmut Wüllenweber

The Ring of Power

Das Video wurde offenbar für die jüngeren Zuschauer produziert, aber da das TV Progamm meist schlecht und Bankster Bailouts gerade so populär sind sollte man es doch mal anschauen finde ich …

China to the rescue …

China’s National Bureau of Statistics released fourth quarter GDP growth statistics for 2008 today, and it turns out that (according to their initial estimates) the Chinese economy expanded by 6.8 per cent in the last quarter of the year when compared with the same period in 2007. This was the weakest quarterly year on year growth rate in seven years. For the year as a whole, the economy grew 9 per cent, down from the revised 13 per cent growth rate in 2007.

China must surely devalue Investors now reluctantly accept that this recession is the worst since The Great Depression…Yet beware: outright deflation has already arrived and world trade is collapsing.
Korean GDP has just declined a MASSIVE annualized 21% in 2008 Q4! China is now joining the rest of the world in the stinking cesspit of uncontrolled economic slump…
The data out of Asia today was truly shocking and removes any lingering doubt in my mind whether we are truly facing a global economic depression. The 20% annualized collapse in South
Korean GDP in Q4 last year was not the worst of it. Japanese exports declined at a record annual pace, contracting an incredible 35% yoy!…

Strikingly, Japanese exports to the US were down some 37% yoy, losing some 26pp since the 11% yoy contraction in July. But we cannot highlight strongly enough how truly mindboggling Japan’s collapse in exports to China are. Last July they were expanding at a 16% yoy pace. Now they are contracting at a 35% yoy rate! This is a phenomenon throughout the region. Hence despite the notoriously manipulated Chinese GDP data showing a shocking slowdown in GDP growth to 6.8% yoy, I would eat my hat if the Chinese economy was doing anything other than contracting right now. Albert Edwards Societe Generale

Jim Rogers: ‘Sell any sterling you might have. It’s finished’

Jim Rogers bläst zum Ausstieg aus dem Vereinigten Königreich. Nun, wer es nicht ohnehin schon getan hat, bekommt jetzt einen neuen Anlass. Das britische Pfund sieht er zum US-Dollar auf einen neues Rekordtief fallen; das Letzte notiert bei 1,0520 aus dem Februar 1985.

GBP/USD seit 1985:

Jim Rogers: ‘Sell any sterling you might have. It’s finished’